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Accounting For Stock Options:   
A Historical Perspective 





In recent years stock options have become one of the most dominant and controversial forms of 
executive compensation.  Stock options are controversial not only because of the sheer 
magnitude of some executive option grants, but also because of the method used to account for 
them.  Currently, the fair value of stock options does not have to be reported as compensation 
expense on the income statement.  Critics maintain this approach results in an inflated and 
misleading amount of reported net earnings.  This paper addresses the role of stock options as an 
effective means of employee compensation and traces the historical development of the 
accounting treatment of stock options.  In addition, the current reporting requirements for 
options are discussed along with recommendations for improving the manner in which stock 
options are accounted  for.          
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
uring the last decade, stock options have gone from being a relatively negligible part of executive 
compensation to being the dominant portion.  By the end of  2001, stock options were used by 90% of large 
U.S. corporations (Tyson, 2002), and they accounted for 58% of the compensation packages for chief 
executives in large U.S. companies (Economist, 2002).  Stock options are designed to give employees the right to 
buy a certain number of shares of the company’s stock at a specified price after a specified period of time, usually 
within ten years.  For example, if an employee has an option to buy stock at ten dollars a share when it is trading at 
thirty dollars a share, the employee can purchase the stock from the company at ten and immediately sell it in the 
marketplace for a twenty dollar per share profit.    
 
 Stock options have become an increasingly controversial method of compensation.  This is due in part 
because of the manner in which options are accounted for in the financial statements of companies that issue them.   
Under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), companies are not currently required to expense stock 
options on the income statement, even though like wages they are generally viewed as a form of compensation.  
Some knowledgeable financial observers believe that failure to expense stock options results in a significant 
distortion in reported earnings and results in the failure of financial statements to accurately represent corporate 
performance (Lagomarsino, 2002).  This view is supported by a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of 100 publicly 
traded, high-tech and emerging companies that found that the median reduction in earnings resulting from the 
expensing of options in the year 2000 would have been 16.5% (Whitman, 2002). 
 
 The primary role of accounting is to communicate financial information to users of the financial statements.  
Adequate, informative disclosure is a standard by which accounting can be judged.  Important financial decisions 
concerning how resources are to be allocated in the capital markets are made based upon representations made in the 
financial statements.  The purpose of this paper is to:  (1) analyze the role of stock options as an effective means of 
compensation, (2) trace the historical development of the accounting treatment of stock options, (3) discuss the 
current method of accounting for stock options, and (4) suggest changes to improve the accounting for stock options.   
           
 
___________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the author via email. 
D 
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2.0  Compensation Strategy 
 
 A strategic compensation plan should effectively tie together the achievement of organizational goals with 
employee rewards.  The compensation plan should be designed to motivate managers to achieve high levels of 
performance by basing their compensation on their performance as well as that of the company.   In addition, the 
plan should be designed to retain talented executives as well as recruit new talent.  Stock options have often been 
used as part of a strategy to develop employee loyalty to a company by providing them with a future equity interest 
based on improvements in long term measures such as earnings per share and company stock prices.   In the last 
decade for example, cash strapped, high-tech startup companies that did not have the means to pay large cash 
salaries have used stock options to attract talented employees.  In addition to saving these small companies millions 
of dollars in cash salaries, stock options served as a link between the fortunes of the employees and the success of 
the company, and thus served as a valuable means of recruitment and retention of valued employees.       
 
 Stock options have also been promoted as a means to solve a weakness in corporate ownership referred to 
as the principal-agent problem (Lee, 2002).  This problem occurs when one group of people owns the company 
while another group manages it.  The two groups do not necessarily have the same interests regarding the use of 
corporate resources.  For example, salaried senior executives may be inclined to spend company resources on perks, 
such as corporate jets and yachts that stockholders do not view as good stewardship of company resources.  Thus it 
becomes important to design executive incentive systems that align their interest with that of the shareholders.  
Stock options, it is argued, achieve this goal by turning managers into stockholders and therefore giving them an 
interest in the financial success of the company.  As shareholders, managers would then have the motivation to 
concentrate on improving company earnings and stock prices, and of course shareholder wealth.  In fact, a 
considerable amount of economic literature suggest that the net effect of stock options is positive in that they result 
in earnings growing faster due to the beneficial incentives they provide top management (Malkiel and Baumol, 
2002).      
 
 In addition, stock option advocates argue that options provide a method of compensating managers that 
really does not “cost” the company because it does not have to pay out cash, as it would if salaries and bonuses were 
being paid.  From this perspective, stock options are viewed as a redistribution of benefits between initial 
shareholders and the recipients of stock options.  This approach to compensation does not result in the reduction of 
the overall amount of the earnings, but rather only affects the way the earnings are divided up.  Furthermore, another 
often enormous benefit of using stock options as compensation is that while stock options do not have to be 
expensed on the income statement, current tax laws allow companies a tax deduction for the full amount of the gain 
the employees realize when they exercise their options (Colvin, 2002).  As a result of the tax deductibility of stock 
options, in 2000 Microsoft saved $2.06 billion in taxes, Cisco $1.4 billion, and Enron converted what would have 
been a $112 million tax liability into a $278 million refund (Judis, 2002).   
 
 However, opponents of stock options have cited a number of flaws they see associated with the use of stock 
options.  Critics of stock options have argued that these plans do not always achieve the goal of aligning the long-
term interest of shareholders with that of management.   In fact, some critics argue that the use of stock options 
actually creates incentives for top executives to manipulate earnings through inappropriate and even fraudulent 
accounting practices.  Deceptive practices that boost reported earnings in the short-term drive up the value of the 
shares of stock as well as the value of executive stock options.   
 
One of the concerns regarding stock options is the sheer magnitude of the wealth that CEOs can receive 
from the exercise of stock options.  For example, in 2001 the CEO of The Oracle Corporation received $706 million 
from the exercise of long-held stock options, even though the company’s stock was off 57% for the year ( Lavelle, 
Jespersen, and Arndt, 2002).  As another example of perceived excesses associated with stock options, in 2000 the 
chairman of Enron realized $123 million from exercising options while most ordinary stockholders lost nearly all of 
the value of their investments and thousands of workers lost their jobs (Hitt and Schlesinger, 2002).  Critics of the 
current reporting method maintain that expensing the current value of the stock options on the income statement 
would make their cost more transparent and thus reduce some of the excesses and extravagances in executive 
compensation (Malkiel and Baumol, 2002). 
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Other critics of stock option plans question the link between compensation and performance that options 
are supposed to provide due to the repricing policies of some companies.  For example, if stock values fall and the 
option price is above the current market price of the stock and is likely to remain so for some time, the options are 
essentially worthless.  Therefore, some companies feel compelled to reprice the options at a lower exercise price or 
issue new options at a lower exercise price in order to retain employees  (Grant and Ciccotello, 2002).  This situation 
is particularly prevalent in high-tech startup companies that experience a great deal of volatility in their share prices.   
Critics argue that repricing removes the incentives that options are designed to provide, and that it in fact may even 
reward bad performance.  Furthermore, while executives are protected from the risk associated with bad 
performance (i.e., dropping stock prices), existing stockholders are not.                  
  
Of even greater concern to some is the dilution of current shareholder’s interest resulting from the issuance 
of stock options (Gray, 2002).   When the options are exercised, the company issues new shares which results in the 
same amount of earnings being spread over more shares of stock.  The resulting decline in earnings per share 
reflects the reduction of existing stockholder’s share of the corporate earnings.  Furthermore, if the stock options had 
not been issued at below market exercise prices, the company could have sold new shares at the current market price 
which would have brought in additional cash that could have been employed by the company to generate new 
earnings.  So there is in fact a cost to the company, an opportunity cost, associated with stock options.  On the other 
hand, if the company chooses not to have its earnings diluted when options are exercised, then it must go into the 
marketplace and purchase, for cash, treasury shares that can then be distributed upon the exercise of stock options.  
So once again, there is a real cost to the firm associated with the issue of stock options.  These costs are not reflected 
on the earnings statement, but they do have an effect on the company’s cash balance.  In the past, many boards of 
directors viewed stock options as a free way to compensate executives, because unlike salaries and bonuses no cash 
was paid directly to the employees. This perspective often resulted in the over-issue of stock options, which resulted 
in excessive amounts of compensation to executives.  Many boards of directors are now beginning to look more 
closely at stock option plans.          
 
3.0  Historical Development Of The Accounting Treatment Of Stock Options 
 
 The method of accounting for stock options has been very controversial for more than a decade.  Under 
current accounting guidelines, companies must choose to either expense the fair value of the stock options against 
earnings on the income statement or disclose their theoretical value in footnotes to the financial statements.  While 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recommends the former approach, most companies in the past 
have chosen only to disclose the information in footnotes.  In fact, only two companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 
choose to expense stock options on their financial statements in 2001 (Hitt and Schlesinger, 2002).  If a company 
pays employees with cash, the company must record this as an expense that reduces company profits.  On the other 
hand, by issuing stock options rather than paying cash salaries or bonuses, companies can compensate employees 
without ever having to reduce profits.   
  
In the early 1990s the FASB, which is the authoritative body responsible for promulgating generally 
accepted accounting principles, became very concerned about the method of not expensing stock options on the 
income statement.  The primary concerns were that, in the view of the FASB, a) the value of issued stock options is 
compensation, b) compensation is in fact a cost that should be recognized on the income statement, and c) an 
accounting standard that requires nonrecognition of cost results in financial statements that are neither 
representationally faithful nor credible (Derieux, 1994).  As the result of these concerns, the FASB issued an 
exposure draft on June 30, 1993 entitled “Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation.”  The recommendations were 
that the value of stock options issued to employees should be recognized in the financial statements as compensation 
expense and that disclosures related to these options be enhanced.  In other words, the FASB was proposing that a 
new accounting standard be adopted that would require companies to expense the fair value of stock options on their 
income statement, thus reducing the amount of net earnings reported by companies that issued stock options as part 
of their compensation package. 
           
 The exposure draft was met with a firestorm of protest from the business community.  Some critics of the 
exposure draft argued that stock options are not compensation expense because they do not cost the company 
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anything.  In their view, the company simply issues pieces of paper that allow employees to buy stock at a set price.  
If the stock price goes up, the employee benefits because they can buy at the lower exercise price.  Hence no outlay 
cost to the company and thus no expense to the company.   
 
  Other critics of the exposure draft contended that it was difficult if not impossible to appropriately price 
the options at the time of issue.  These opponents of expensing options argued that it is extremely complex to 
calculate their value at the time they are issued with accuracy.  This difficulty is due in part to many variables that 
are associated with options such as:  they do not vest immediately, they are dependent upon continued employment, 
they often are not exercised for five or six years out, and they sometimes are not exercised at all if the stock prices 
fall.  The difficulty of estimating the variables associated with stock options can result in a wide range of estimates 
of the fair value of options at the time of issue.       
 
 Perhaps the argument most used by critics of the exposure draft was that expensing stock options would 
have disastrous effects on American business, and in particular the high-tech industry.  The economic consequences 
argument revolved around the concern that the lower reported net earnings resulting from expensing stock options 
would increase the borrowing cost of start-up companies and put them at a competitive disadvantage in obtaining 
needed venture capital.  Also, required expensing of options might force some high-tech, start-up companies to stop 
using options to attract the type of talented people needed to make their companies successful.  And since these 
types of innovative, high-tech companies were viewed as a driving force in the “new economy”, those opposing 
accounting reforms argued that the United States economy would be harmed if stock options were required to be 
treated as a reduction of company earnings.     
 
 As the result of an intense lobbying effort by the business community, the United States Congress got 
involved.  In the Senate, a bill was introduced that would have mandated that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) require that no compensation expense be reported on the income statements for stock option 
plans.  Against this backdrop, the FASB looked for political support to back their exposure draft but found few 
willing to support their proposal for expensing stock options.  Out of concern of Congressional involvement in 
setting accounting standards on the basis of economic or political agendas, and out of concern that the divisiveness 
of the debate over accounting for stock options could threaten the future of accounting standard-setting in the private 
sector, the FASB backed away from their exposure draft which if adopted would have mandated the expensing of 
stock options.   
 
4.0  Current Method Of Accounting For Stock Options 
 
In 1995, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 123 “Accounting for 
Stock-Based Compensation” which recommends but does not require that compensation cost for the fair value of 
stock-based options plans be recognized on the income statement as an expense (SFAS No.123, 1995).  The position 
of the FASB is that accounting for the cost of compensating employees should be based on the fair value of what is 
paid.  Therefore, the compensation cost resulting from employee stock options should be based on the fair value of 
the stock options granted.  While this value is difficult to determine with complete accuracy, the FASB recommends 
that acceptable option pricing models such at the Black & Scholes Model be used to value options at the date of 
grant and to expense this amount on the income statement.  This accounting approach is referred to as the “fair value 
method.”  The pricing model developed by economists Fischer Black and Myron Scholes is designed to project the 
long-term value of stock options.  Mr. Scholes was awarded a Noble Prize in economics for his work on the model 
(Hitt and Schlesinger, 2002).  This sophisticated mathematical model takes into account such factors as the volatility 
of the underlying stock, the expected dividends during the life of the options, and the expected life of the options.   
 
 Because of the considerable opposition to the FASB’s proposal to require the use of the “fair value 
method”, the final version of SFAS No. 123 allows companies to choose to use the alternative “intrinsic value 
method.”  This approach measures compensation cost as the excess of the market price of the stock over the exercise 
price of the stock options on the date the options are granted.  However, since stock options are generally used to 
provide incentives for executives to grow the value of the company, the exercise price is almost always set at a price 
equal to or greater than the market price of the stock on the date the options are granted.  Thus, the “intrinsic value 
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method” almost always results in no cost being assigned to stock options and therefore no compensation expense 
recognized on the income statement.  However, if a company uses the “intrinsic value method”, the standard 
requires it to disclose in a footnote pro-forma net income and earnings per share data showing what net income 
would have been if the “fair value method” had been used.  In other words, the company would have to disclose in a 
footnote what net income would have been if the fair value of employee stock options had been expensed on the 
income statement (Grant and Ciccotello, 2002).         
 
 Given the benefits of not expensing the fair value of employee stock options against earnings, most 
companies in the past have chosen to use the “intrinsic value method.”  However, if companies were required to 
recognize stock options as an expense, the impact on reported earnings would be quite significant.  For example, 
Bear Sterns & Company estimate that net profits of Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index companies would have been 
9% lower than reported if the estimated cost of stock options had been expensed against earnings in 2000 
(Gleckman, 2002).   
 
5.0  Recommendations 
 
Because of the unjustified size of some executive stock option plans, and due to the inflated earnings that 
result from the failure of most companies to expense stock options, reform in the area of stock options is needed.  
This reform must focus on both the use of stock options as a means of executive compensation and the manner in 
which options are reported on the financial statements.       
 
 Reform in the area of compensation requires the use of strict performance-based option plans.  No longer 
should executive insiders reap enormous gains while at the same time shareholders are losing their retirement 
savings.  Furthermore, mediocre performance should not be rewarded, as can happen with standard stock options 
during bull markets when almost all stock prices rise.  The old plans must be replaced with ones that reward 
management only when the company outperforms the market.  Companies should be expected to clearly disclose 
whether the executive stock option plans require better than average performance in order for executives to benefit 
from the exercise of options.  Without such requirements, executives may reap huge rewards for mediocre or even 
below average performance.  For example, if a stock option is issued with an exercise price equal to the market price 
on the date of issue, say $100, a mere 5% annual increase in the stock price compounded over five years could result 
in an enormous profit for the options holder. This would occur because the option holder could purchase company 
stock at the exercise price of $100 when five years latter the market price is $127.   This benefit would accrue to the 
company executive even if the average annual return on all stocks was greater than the 5% earned by the company.  
Existing shareholders would be better served if the exercise price of the options rose every year by a percentage 
equal to at least the average increase for all stocks.  This approach would assure that executives are rewarded only 
for better than average performance.  Adjusting the exercise price upward would help achieve one of the primary 
goals of executive stock options, that of aligning the interest of corporate executives with that of the shareholders.    
 
 Needed reform in accounting for stock options has become apparent in recent years.  Various studies have 
shown the extent to which the current treatment of not expensing stock options has resulted in companies reporting 
inflated profits.  For example, the Federal Reserve has calculated that if stock options had been charged against 
earnings in the years from 1995 to 2000, Fortune 500 companies would have seen their annual profit margins 
reduced from 12 percent to 9.4 percent (Judis, 2002).  Another study suggest that the value of unexpensed stock 
options amounted to nearly 20% of the profits of large American firms in the year 2000 (Economist, 2002).   
 
A survey by the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) found that more than 80% 
of portfolio managers and financial analysts worldwide believe that employee stock options are in fact compensation 
and should be expensed on the income statement (Hayward, 2002).  Currently, the information on stock options can 
be found in the footnotes to the financial statements, but investors must search for this information and then factor it 
into their valuation of the company.  While some analyst don’t necessarily believe they would get more information, 
they do believe the markets would be better served if the fair value of options were expensed on the earnings 
statement because the financial statements would be more transparent, would provide a more accurate picture of the 
company’s financial position, and would give investors more confidence in the financial information being 
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presented.  Some investors believe that the current form of disclosure is a deliberate attempt to conceal information 
about stock options, and this brings into doubt other presentations made by the company.     
   
6.0  Conclusion 
 
Reform is never easy.  It is particularly difficult when a large number of influential individuals have a 
vested interest in things remaining the same.  However, recent corporate scandals have refocused attention on 
accounting practices in general and accounting for stock options in particular.  Reported net income and earnings per 
share represent some of the most important information companies provide to investors.   The proliferation of stock 
options as a form of executive compensation and the failure to expense this compensation cost  has systematically 
inflated corporate earnings, distorted financial statements, misled investors, and encouraged a diversion of capital 
resources away from their most productive and efficient use.  The adoption and use of accounting standards must be 
done in a manner that best serves the public good.  Better accounting standards provide transparency that leads to 
greater investor confidence in the capital markets, which leads to better allocation of the nation’s resources.   The 
accounting profession must be unyielding in its efforts to improve accounting standards by improving the method of 
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